In September, for the first time, two out of every three new cars sold in China were electrified. While Beijing’s carmakers race ahead, Europe is softening its own targets. Can it afford to?
For years, the electric car was presented as the car of the future. In China, it has quietly become the car of the present. According to the China Passenger Car Association (CPCA), new energy vehicles (NEVs), which include fully electric cars and plug-in hybrids, made up 67% of new car sales in September 2026, the first time the share passed two thirds. In October it climbed again, to a record 67.5%. Only six years ago, in 2020, the figure was 6%. No major car market has ever changed its technology this quickly, and the consequences are now reaching European roads, European factories and European climate policy.
The headline number deserves some nuance. China’s car market is actually shrinking: total passenger car sales fell by 27% year-on-year in October and by more than 22% over the first ten months of 2026. Electric cars are not booming in absolute terms; rather, combustion engine sales are collapsing. Sales of petrol-only cars fell by 31% in the first nine months of the year, while battery electric sales slipped by only 4%. A full purchase-tax exemption for NEVs also ended in December 2025, which explains why their share briefly dropped to 39% in January before recovering.
The main accelerator was geopolitical. When the war with Iran broke out in late February and traffic through the Strait of Hormuz was disrupted, fuel prices rose sharply, and the CPCA explicitly blamed higher petrol prices for the weak demand for combustion cars. The result has been a remarkable test of what electrification can do for energy security. China’s oil imports between January and September fell by 15% compared with 2025, about 470 million fewer barrels, and analysts at Ember estimate that China’s electric fleet alone has displaced around 143 million barrels of oil since the crisis began. A decade of industrial policy that once looked like an expensive bet suddenly looks like an insurance policy.
With demand weak at home, Chinese carmakers are looking abroad. In October alone, China exported 582,000 electrified passenger cars, 145% more than a year earlier, and NEVs now make up almost 63% of the country’s passenger car exports. Exports now account for a third of Chinese manufacturers’ electrified car shipments, compared with 15% a year ago. Europe is one of the main destinations. Between January and August 2026, Chinese brands raised their share of the European car market from 7.1% to 11.3%, selling more than one million cars and accounting for 84% of the entire market’s growth. BYD has overtaken Ford in European registrations, while Volkswagen lost a full percentage point of market share between January and September.
Europe tried to slow this advance with tariffs. Since 2024, Chinese battery electric cars have faced extra duties of up to 35.3% on top of the standard 10%. But the tariffs only covered fully electric models, so Chinese brands simply pushed plug-in hybrids instead: by August, one in three plug-in hybrids sold in Europe came from a Chinese brand. In January 2026, Brussels and Beijing agreed a new system in which Chinese exporters can avoid the duties by committing to minimum prices, volume caps and investment in the EU. Some economists argue this may help Chinese firms more than European ones, since higher minimum prices can mean higher profits per car. The deeper lesson is that tariffs can buy time, but they cannot close a cost and technology gap on their own.
At the same time, the EU is relaxing its own climate rules for cars. In December 2025, the European Commission proposed replacing the 2035 ban on new combustion engine cars with a 90% cut in fleet emissions. This month, MEPs on the European Parliament’s environment committee went further, backing an 87.5% target plus extra credits for carmakers using low-carbon steel. The rules still need approval from the full Parliament and member states, but the direction is clear. Supporters argue that the industry needs breathing room: EU car production remains around 20% below 2019 levels, according to Bruegel. Critics warn that softer targets send a confusing signal to investors and give Chinese competitors even more time to build their lead in the cars Europe will eventually need to sell.
The pressure is already visible in Europe’s factories. In Italy, Stellantis produced just 379,706 vehicles in 2025, the lowest figure since 1955 and roughly half the 751,384 built in 2023, according to the FIM-CISL union. Production has recovered in 2026, up almost 14% in the first half, but the union has lowered its full-year estimate to around 450,000 vehicles. Tellingly, part of Stellantis’s answer is to work with China rather than against it. Its Chinese partner Leapmotor has started assembling cars in Poland, and Stellantis plans to build an affordable electric “E-Car” at Pomigliano d’Arco from 2028, with Leapmotor reported to be its main technology partner. BYD, meanwhile, is preparing to start production at its new plant in Szeged, Hungary, at the end of 2026.
This suggests a different way of thinking about the competition. In the 1980s, Japanese carmakers forced American and European manufacturers to rethink how they built cars, and part of the response came through joint ventures and factories on Western soil. Something similar may now be happening with batteries and software. The European companies most likely to succeed will not be those protected the longest, but those that learn fastest, whether by partnering with Chinese firms, securing their own battery supply chains, or competing on design and quality rather than on the combustion engine.
China’s two-out-of-three moment is not only an industrial story; it is a climate story. Transport is one of the hardest sectors to decarbonise, and China has shown that when prices, policy and an oil shock align, a whole country can switch technologies in a few years. Europe now faces a choice. It can treat electric cars mainly as a threat to be managed with tariffs and delays, or as the market it must win. The first option may protect jobs for a while. Only the second is likely to protect them for good.
Written by Alejandro Martos
SOURCES
• https://cnevpost.com/2026/11/09/china-oct-2026-nev-retail-sales-cpca/
• https://www.am-online.com/news/byd-overtakes-ford-as-chinese-brands-grow-and-tesla-recovers
• https://www.automotiveworld.com/topics/e-mobility/china-eu-reach-framework-for-ev-price-minimums/
• https://www.lautomobile.aci.it/?p=46350
• https://www.finanzaonline.com/?p=778107
• https://www.just-auto.com/news/byd-hungary-production-q4-2026/